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According to Terry Eagleton, the act of being a critic is ‘one of unmasking and demystification, 
confronting the work [subject to review] like a seasoned cop browbeating a shifty suspect’ 
while exposing the author’s ‘blindspots and ambiguities’.1 On this account, Scotford’s 
Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law immediately ought to be 
served not with a suspicious glare but a ‘get out of jail free’ card. For it is an excellent 
exposition of the role played by omnipresent (yet nebulous) environmental principles. It merits 
a place as one of the more important contributions to the literature on environmental principles, 
and thereby also environmental law itself, on account of its originality and doctrinal rigour. 
Consequently, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law holds 
significant implications for environmental law as a legal discipline as well as for environmental 
law as a scholarly undertaking.  
A central theme of the book is that of contingency. Scotford’s main thesis is that the 
ubiquitous environmental principles, despite their abundance, have very little content in the 
abstract. That is, the legal content of any environmental principle can only be revealed through 
a close examination of the legal culture in which the principle is found. As a result of this, the 
content of the principle will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Not only is this contingency 
explained by the open-ended nature of many of the environmental principles themselves, but 
also by the very nature of environmental law itself, which is arguably lacking in firm 
foundations. Scotford argues that ‘there is no universal doctrinal tradition of “environmental 
                                                          
 Reader in Environmental Law, Newcastle Law School (ole.pedersen@ncl.ac.uk)  
1 Terry Eagleton, ‘Not Just Anybody’ (2017) LRB 35, 35.  
2 
 
principles” in environmental law’ and, moreover, that establishing ‘a singular theoretical 
tradition is not possible, considering the ambiguous and open-ended nature of environmental 
principles’.2  
 To execute this argument, Scotford exhibits characteristically thorough analysis of the 
way in which environmental principles are applied and interpreted by the courts in two separate 
jurisdictions: the EU courts; and in the case law from the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court (NSWLEC). Though critics might argue that a focus on two Western 
jurisdictions narrows the scope of the examination, this analysis yields a varied picture of the 
ways in which environmental principles are afforded legal meaning. In the context of EU 
environmental law, Scotford highlights how the principles, despite having ‘no freestanding 
roles to compel or review generally the exercise of policy discretion’,3 nevertheless perform a 
range of doctrinal functions. On Scotford’s analysis, the application by the EU courts of 
environmental principles broadly falls in three ‘treatment categories’:4 (i) policy cases (in 
which the environmental principles play no role in informing the reasoning of a court, serving 
exclusively as policy drivers behind specific environmental initiatives);5 (ii) interpretive cases 
(where the principles are used teleologically to interpret legal competences of the EU and 
legislative initiatives in light of the principles as these are found in, for example, the Treaties);6 
and (iii) as informing legal test cases (where principles are used to police the boundaries of the 
decision-making authority of the EU institutions and the Member States).7 
On the whole, this exposition highlights how the adjudication of environmental 
principles in the EU is not only varied and multi-faceted, but also that it represents the 
contingent expression of the specific legal culture and domains found in the legal order of the 
EU. This inter-changeable application of the principles, moreover, highlights how they do not 
necessarily serve to unify environmental law as a body of law, but instead how they, at times, 
contribute to legal incoherence by informing legal doctrines in different ways and in 
inconsistent manners. Not only does this variation play out across various parts of the EU 
environmental acquis and non-environmental areas (influenced through the principle of 
integration), but also within the judicial institutions of the EU (the General Court and the 
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CJEU), reflecting differences in jurisdiction and competences as well differences in the ways 
cases end up before the courts.  
In the context of the case law from the NSWLEC, Scotford uncovers yet a further layer 
of context-specific application of environmental principles (or ‘ecologically sustainable 
development’ (ESD) principles as they are known in the statutory regime found in New South 
Wales, Australia), conferring power on the Court. Not only are the principles themselves 
different from those found in EU law (encompassing, in the NSWLEC, the precautionary 
principle, the principle of intergenerational equity, the principle of conservation of biological 
diversity and ecological integrity, and the principle of internalisation of costs) but uniquely so 
is the ‘idiosyncratic’ jurisdiction of the Court.8 Striking features of this unique legal culture are 
the fact that the NSWLEC is a specialist environmental tribunal, enjoying exclusive first 
instance jurisdiction over a significant range of environmental statutes, and the fact that the 
Court hears full merits reviews in many cases.9 Taken together, this necessarily impacts on the 
ways in which the NSWLEC entertains cases and therefore also on its doctrines of law. 
Importantly, the application of environmental principles by the NSWLEC is therefore not 
merely a doctrinal basis for legal reasoning, but also a foundation used by the Court to develop 
its institutional authority, forming a structure for the Court’s identity and its place in 
environmental decision-making more generally. 
In mapping the NSWLEC case law, Scotford identifies five different categories of 
judicial treatment or engagement with environmental principles: (i) as mandatory 
considerations in decisions of planning consent; (ii) as relevant considerations across other 
areas of planning decision-making; (iii) as mandatory considerations in a whole host of other 
statutes aside from the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act; (iv) as implicitly 
conferring requirements on decision-makers irrespective of the statutory regime at hand; and 
(v) as relevant considerations in all aspects of the Court’s jurisdictions, including, for example,  
procedural issues and matters such as costs allocation and sentencing. Unlike what is the case 
in the context of the EU, the ESD principles serve to unify the legal doctrine of the Court, 
(Scotford calls them ‘the doctrinal centrepiece’),10 it is necessarily in a local context shaped by 
and given force through the legal culture of the Court and its unique jurisdiction. In other words, 
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the expression of environmental principles found in the case law of the NSWLEC is ultimately 
contingent upon the legal culture of the Court, which is evidently different from legal cultures 
found in other jurisdictions. 
 The implications following this analysis and ‘thick description’ of the specific legal 
cultures are clear: environmental principles ‘do not neatly unify environmental law as a 
universal body of law’.11 Instead, environmental principles are given legal content and meaning 
through and in the context of the specific legal setting (or cultures) in which they find 
themselves.12 This argument, in turn, causes problems for those keen on furnishing a universal 
normative foundation for the discipline of environmental law: a discipline seen by some as 
incoherent and in lacking a foundational basis.13 As Scotford deftly shows, there are, however, 
good reasons for wanting to develop such universal legal foundations for environmental law. 
First and foremost amongst these reasons is the argument that by affording great weight to 
environmental principles (and from time to time to other legal norms), the principles serve an 
instrumental purpose by seeking to underpin and furnish a more effective body of 
environmental law. Second, affording environmental principles a central focus serves a legal 
purpose in so far as it stabilises environmental law as a discipline. That is, by relying on 
environmental principles, environmental law itself becomes not only more stable but also more 
‘legal’ by way of analogy to foundational principles found in other more ‘mature’ disciplines 
of law (such as public international law). Often, when pursuing this line of thinking, authority 
is based on the work of Ronald Dworkin who famously afforded a central role to principles in 
the attempt to develop a general theory of law and legal doctrine.14 Scotford argues, however, 
that reliance on Dworkin is misplaced on account of there being no universally ‘incremental 
development of a body of judicial doctrine’ and ‘no single legal system in which environmental 
principles might best fit’,15 and on account of the argument that environmental principles 
chiefly communicate the policy preferences excluded from Dworkin’s account of individual 
rights.16 To this, one could add that adherence to Dworkin’s distinction between rules and 
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principles is in itself misguided as it seeks to construe a difference which is, on closer scrutiny, 
not forthcoming once the argument of contingency is fully appreciated.17 Arguably, as with 
principles, rules themselves are contingent upon the context and legal culture in which they are 
applied (something which Dworkin himself seemed alert to).18 
The lack of stabilising power and lack of ability to facilitate sought-after coherence is 
not to say that environmental principles always fail to unify a legal culture or jurisdiction. As 
Scotford’s analysis of the NSWLEC shows, the application of environmental principles in that 
specific context does indeed serve to provide a certain degree of coherence as well as a settled 
body of case law. The point to recall, however, is that this stabilising ‘power’ of environmental 
principles is context-specific and local to that explicit legal culture.  This is the case even where 
courts look to other jurisdictions for inspiration when developing their jurisprudence as in the 
case of the NSWLEC. A similarly important point to note is that Scotford’s main theme of 
contingency is not to be taken to suggest that environmental principles cannot per se or 
necessarily fail to enrich and enhance environmental law doctrine.19  
 In light of the emphasis on local legal cultures and the argument that these serve to 
shape the application of environmental principles to a degree that prevents universal 
foundations from being established on the basis of the principles, one might be forgiven for 
thinking that there is a touch of anti-foundationalism underlying Scotford’s account. Support 
for this is found in the fact that the emphasis on contingency as a determinative factor behind 
legal content and doctrine is, in some sense, not new. Clifford Geertz thus highlighted that 
appreciation of ‘legal sensibility’ drives home how ‘law is local knowledge not placeless 
principles’.20  The emphasis on contingency is, moreover, a trademark of the antifoundational 
school of thought often referred to as neo-pragmatism.21 Prominent amongst these thinkers is 
Richard Rorty who expressly emphasised the contingency of foundational claims.22 With 
specific application to principles, even Edmund Burke noted that ‘circumstances […] give in 
reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect’23 and 
more recently Stanley Fish (though hardly a pragmatist) has similarly highlighted how the 
invocation of principles ‘will always and necessarily proceed from [a particular] vantage 
                                                          
17 Pierre Schlag, ‘Rules and Standards’ (1985) 33 UCLA L Rev 379. 
18 Dworkin (n 14) 27, who observes that ‘it is not always clear from the form of a standard whether it is a rule or 
a principle’. 
19 Scotford does, however recognise that environmental principles ‘represent significant developments in the 
evolution of environmental law across and between legal systems’ (n 2) 30. 
20 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge (Fontana Press 1993) 218. 
21 Brian Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory (OUP 1997) 26. 
22 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (CUP 1989). 
23 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Wilder Publications 2012) 8. 
6 
 
point’.24 In other words, principles in general (not just environmental principles) are contingent 
upon a given context.  
A further similarity between Scotford’s argument and the anti-foundationalists is found 
in the argument that this contingency is not necessarily something to begrudge. What (amongst 
other things) distinguishes parts of the anti-foundationalist thinking (and Scotford’s argument 
with it, it seems) from the late critical legal studies movement with its emphasis on exposing 
the doctrinal inconsistencies in the law, is the point that the contingency of the law and 
environmental principles, and the potential for inconsistency that goes with it, is, in most cases, 
a good thing.  As Scotford argues: ‘rather than seeing their definitional and normative 
uncertainty as barriers to the legal profile of environmental principles, these attributes of 
ambiguity open up spaces for legal development.’25 Similarly, anti-foundationalists elsewhere 
have argued that ‘the inconsistency of doctrine is what enables law to work’, allowing the law 
to perform what some see as its ‘amazing trick’.26 The fact that incoherence and lack of 
unifying foundations do not necessarily hinder the law from developing is important (though 
as discussed below, scholars will have different opinions about whether the law develops 
optimally). For the lack of foundations offers a constructive understanding of environmental 
law, thus inviting further scrutiny of a discipline which is – notwithstanding its coming of age 
– still in many respects emerging. In light of this, Environmental Principles and the Evolution 
of Environmental Law poses two challenges for the thoughtful reader and environmental 
scholar: one is legal (pertaining to the foundations of environmental law); and the other is 
scholarly (relating to the impact the first challenge has on the scholarly endeavour). The 
remainder of this review will focus on these two challenges.  
 
FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
If indeed Scotford’s analysis with its emphasis on contingency and the anti-foundational role 
of environmental principles is correct, there are arguably two ways to respond. First, those keen 
on identifying some form of foundational base for environmental law (be it universal or not) 
might simply throw in the towel and say ‘forget about it’. If indeed everything is contingent, 
what is the point? This is, for good reasons, unlikely to happen. After all, there is an implicit 
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assumption in Scotford’s argument that scholars and lawyers alike strongly favour foundational 
norms underpinning legal disciplines when she argues that ‘identity-seeking environmental law 
scholarship’ has too readily embraced environmental principles.27 That is to say, environmental 
law wishes to have a formal existence.28 Consequently, there are likely to be other attempts, to 
‘foundationalise’ the law relying, for example, on environmental rights or other so-called 
‘grundnorms’.29 Moreover, throwing in the towel by reference to the necessary contingency of 
all matters environmental principles-related (and possibly environmental law as a discipline 
with it), would in itself fly in the face of contingency. For if indeed these matters are contingent 
(and many others along with it), it necessarily follows that the claim to contingency is 
contingent itself.30 In response to this abundance of contingency, environmental law scholars 
might indeed be forgiven for giving up.31 Doing so, however, would be an abrogation of 
scholarly responsibilities owed to the interpretive community of environmental scholars.32 
Consequently, it follows that where the attempt to build some form of foundational base for 
environmental law must take into account the contingency of the subject matter, variation and 
disparity will follow as Scotford highlights. Where this is the case, the need for a scholarly 
work arguably becomes all the more urgent (though there are challenges associated with this 
as discussed below), as the need for systemisation, understanding and knowledge-building is 
facilitated through the scholarly endeavour of probing and prodding of the law – often on the 
local, micro level.33 
From this, the second type of response to the disparity of contingency emerges. 
Considering the desire to build foundational norms, and taking into account the constraints 
imposed by contingency, what would the sought-after foundations of environmental law then 
look like? The first thing to point out is that these foundations would necessarily be very 
generic. One way to conceptualise the foundations of environmental law in a sufficiently 
flexible manner would be to think of them as being made up of a series of wider values and 
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norms, exerting influence on and shaping the content of the law, including the environmental 
principles themselves (e.g. the principle of sustainable development).34 These values explicated 
below include: (i) Instrumentalism (providing environmental law an instrumental and 
purposive base, aiming at providing environmental protection);(ii) Egalitarianism (according 
to which a central objective of environmental law ought to be anchored in perceptions of 
fairness); (iii) Economic efficiency (imbuing in the law an element of cost effectiveness); (iv) 
Deontologism (seeking to shape environmental law in the vernacular of rights, be it human 
rights or natural environmental rights); and(v) Pragmatism (seeking to maintain a focus not on 
giving environmental law a specific ‘flavour’ but on what may be practically relevant). 
These generic approaches (and possible other ones) are, as a matter of description, 
found throughout environmental law, though they are often relied upon as well as a matter of 
prescription by proponents seeking to argue that environmental law ought to take a specific 
form or have a specific purpose. Examples of the former include statutory provisions, 
containing elements of the different values. Section 4 of the Environment Act 1990, 
establishing the Environment Agency, provides that the Agency’s principle aim is to ‘protect 
and enhance the environment’ (i.e. an instrumental burden, aiming at facilitating environmental 
protection). This burden is, not surprisingly, far from absolute as, elsewhere in the Act, s. 39 
provides that in executing these functions the Agency shall take into account the costs and 
benefits of exercising its duty. However obvious this may seem, the point is that the two, in 
this case seemingly binary forces, exert a simultaneous pressure on the law, serving to balance 
the legal duties found in the law.  
These values and forces not only assert themselves within statutes but also act as drives 
behind specific legal initiatives and regulatory agendas. A recent example is the obligation 
found in s. 108 of the Deregulation Act 2015, requiring certain regulatory agencies to ‘have 
regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth’. A further example is found in the 
strong presence of the economic efficiency norm within certain market-based regulatory 
instruments, such as cap and trade systems, in which a driving force is the aspiration of 
achieving the instrumental norm of environmental protection but at the lowest possible cost.  
The emphasis on deontological values is most prominently found where core objectives 
are expressed in the terminology of rights, for example in international instruments or domestic 
constitutional provisions in the form of human rights to a safe and healthy environment.35 The 
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deontological norm is at times linked to instrumentalism when the deontological terminology 
of rights is used to support rights for the environment not to be interfered with. Consequently, 
the deontological norm finds expression both in terms of anthropocentric perspectives (i.e. 
human rights) as well as in ecocentric terms (i.e. environmental-focused rights). This latter 
incarnation is most commonly seen in the statutory initiatives (as well as the accompanying 
prescriptive scholarship), providing for a ‘right’ for the environment found in wild law and 
earth jurisprudence (and elsewhere).36  
Alongside this runs the influence exerted on environmental law by the egalitarian value. 
This influence is most commonly expressed in the context of ‘environmental justice’ and gives 
rise to concerns of the impact which the law has in respect to inequality between different social 
and racial demographics. Nevertheless, the egalitarian influence succeeds in shaping the design 
of the law across different layers of jurisdictions (in international environmental law, as well 
as in domestic law) and ultimately the content of the law. For example, so-called ‘cumulative 
impacts’ are identified as a material consideration in national planning guidance for waste 
management where waste planning authorities assess new and/or enhanced waste management 
facilities, and fairness remains an important consideration in the international climate change 
regime.37  
 In response to these seemingly conflicting influences, the pragmatic force commonly 
expresses itself where decision-makers are having to implement the law or adjudicate on 
challenges to a given environmental law initiative (be it policy-based or statutory). Thus the 
most clear-cut example of the pragmatic influence is found in the judiciary where emphasis is, 
from time to time, expressly given to the pragmatic dogma of ‘what difference would it make’ 
when the courts exercise discretion in the context of providing remedies.38 Examples thus 
include judicial decisions in which, when faced with challenges to environmental decision-
making grounded in part in the instrumental or deontological norms, the courts react with a 
pragmatic response, pointing out that providing the claimant with the desired remedy is likely 
to make little difference, as a result of the legal duty being one of process and conduct rather 
than result. In Champion, Lord Carnwath thus rejected the appellant’s challenge to the grant of 
a planning permission notwithstanding the absence of the appropriate assessment required by 
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the EIA Directive.39 Quashing the permission, and requiring the planning authority to re-
consider its decision, would in all likelihood have made no material difference.40 A similar 
result was reached in Walton where Lord Carnwath rejected the challenge to a planned road 
scheme by reference to the claimant not having been significantly prejudiced: ‘Even if there 
had been some technical breach of those rules, [the claimant] would not have been entitled to 
a remedy, because he has not shown, or even alleged, that his own interests have been 
significantly prejudiced.’41 To a certain extent, these cases might be construed as examples of 
what ‘judges do’ when taking into account all the relevant conditions ‘on the ground’ as well 
as keeping an eye on the consequential implications of a decision. Or it may be construed as 
an example of the way in which courts struggle with the challenges posed by environmental 
adjudication against a background of well-established doctrines of adjudication in public and 
administrative law.42 A more plausible reading, however, in the context of environmental law, 
is that the court’s decision can be seen as a pragmatic response to a strongly deontological 
claim (i.e. that the absence of the legally mandated appropriate assessment must invalidate the 
underlying decision) grounded in the precedent of Berkeley.43 Tellingly, in Champion as well 
as in Walton, the Supreme Court was keen to distinguish the decisions from the strongly 
deontological support offered by Lord Hoffmann for the environmental impact assessment 
regime in Berkeley. In other words, the Court is ready to distinguish from past precedent if 
doing so brings ‘about the best results in the present case’.44  
In turn, this perhaps suggests that some of the wider influences and norms identified 
here are more readily found in certain contexts than others. That is, perhaps the pragmatic 
influence is particularly prominent amongst adjudicators whereas the instrumental force is 
particularly prevalent amongst scholars (or a subset thereof).45 In the context of the 
instrumental influence this makes intuitive sense. For if environmental law is perceived as 
serving instrumental purposes, its evident failure in delivering on this purpose provides ready-
made function for the scholarly endeavour. In light of the law’s perceived failure, the scholar 
stands ready to pronounce on this malfunction and to offer advice on how to remedy it.46  
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These wider values and pressure consequently shape the form as well as the content of 
the law and influence environmental law at different stages. What they have in common 
(notwithstanding the tensions between them) is that taken together they make up a heteroglossia 
of environmental law.47 That is, these values form a foundation of the law however vague and 
generic they may be. Like the environmental principles, the precise content of the values will 
be contingent upon the relevant jurisdiction, context and legal culture. But compared to the 
principles, the values arguably display a readily identifiable core (albeit a generic one), 
containing basic premises and expectations from across a wide range of perspectives. As a 
result, they potentially serve as a more foundational basis on which to ground the discipline of 
environmental law. In addition to this, the values are arguably universal to an extent that they 
are prevalent in jurisdictions that do not rely heavily on environmental principles (for example 
in the UK). Importantly, however, this system of norms is not necessarily unique to 
environmental law. It is, in fact, very likely that similar patterns of influences play out across 
different areas of law. Given the nebulousness of the values, to some this is likely to prove 
unsatisfactory as far as the attempt to furnish foundations for environmental law goes. And the 
claim evidently deserves much more teasing out than it is possible to afford it here. However, 
if the claim of contingency advanced by Scotford is to be taken seriously (and this reviewer 
thinks it must), then the foundational core of environmental law will necessarily have a degree 
of ambiguity about it and be very generic.  
The broad nature of the contingent foundations of environmental law, moreover, holds 
lessons for environmental law scholars as alluded to above. This is a point which Scotford is 
acutely alert to. A subsidiary argument in Environmental Principles and the Evolution of 
Environmental Law is that the contingent nature of environmental principles entails a need for 
scholars to be responsive to determinative legal cultures. Scotford thus argues that 
environmental principles have in part instilled a tendency towards ‘fuzzy thinking’ and that 
environmental principles have been used to overcome some of the methodological challenges 
that environmental law scholarship has to grapple with.48 That is, when faced with challenges 
of a multi-jurisdictional and ‘interdisciplinary’ discipline and a legal subject which changes 
rapidly, scholars have sought a safe harbour in the comfort of environmental principles. In the 
course of doing so, however, they have neglected the fine-grained nature of the actual 
application of environmental principles (and thus environmental law) and variances across 
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jurisdictions. In line with this, Scotford’s argument and the modest foundational core of 
environmental law identified above, point to the need for those engaged in analysis of the law 
to not only be alert to the multifaceted nature of environmental law with its contingent and 
conflicting core, but also to appreciate the inherent limits of any foundational claims. It is 
difficult to disagree with Scotford when she argues that ‘doctrinal and legal pluralism is 
inherent in environmental law that crosses jurisdictional boundaries, and that this reality must 
be factored into methodologies for examining [the law]’.49 Where a piece of scholarship 
manages to do so, it is likely to force the reader to reflect on the basic assumptions and 
foundations of one’s discipline, and thus ought to be judged a success. On this benchmark, 
Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law succeeds irrespective of 
whether readers will agree with Scotford’s argument or not. 
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